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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MICHAEL BRANDON ROSE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45935
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-20244

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael Brandon Rose pled guilty to attempted
strangulation. He received a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, and the court
retained jurisdiction.

Thereafter, the district court relinquished jurisdiction but sua sponte

reduced the fixed portion of the sentence to one and a half years. On appeal, Mr. Rose contends
that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its jurisdiction, and in failing to
further reduce his sentence or place him on probation.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On June 2, 2017, Michael Brandon Rose was high on methamphetamine which had been
laced with bath salts when he and his pregnant girlfriend had a verbal disagreement.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.3-4.) When interviewed, Mr. Rose said
that he had choked her, she was coughing, and he became very upset when he realized he was
hurting the woman he loved. (PSI, p.4.) He urged her to go to the hospital. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Rose also shared that he had previously choked his girlfriend in February of 2017. (PSI,
pp.4.) Based on these facts, Mr. Rose was charged by information with two counts of attempted
strangulation. (R., pp.25-26.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Rose pled guilty to one count of attempted
strangulation.

(R., pp.32-39.)

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to cap its

recommendation at ten years, with three years fixed, and a retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.9, L.16 –
p.10, L.2; R., p.35.) The district court accepted the plea and ordered a Presentence Investigation
and a domestic violence assessment. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-6; R., pp.40-43.) The matter was set for
sentencing. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-3.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a ten-year sentence, with three years fixed, and
that the court retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.26, Ls.21-25.) The defense asked the district court to
sentence Mr. Rose to eight years, with two years fixed, but suspend the sentence and place
Mr. Rose on probation. (Tr., p.33, Ls.14-16.) The district court sentenced Mr. Rose to a unified
sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction over him. (Tr., p.42, L.24
– p.43, L.8; R., pp.46-50.)

1

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendums to the PSI, Substance
Abuse Evaluation, Mental Health Evaluation, and letters submitted in support of Mr. Rose.
2

After a hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction but reduced the fixed portion
of Mr. Rose’s sentence by six months. (Tr., p.57, Ls.15-18; R., pp.59-62.) Mr. Rose filed a
timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.63-65.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it retained jurisdiction over Mr. Rose
instead of placing him on probation following his plea of guilty to attempted
strangulation?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Rose
and when it failed to further reduce his sentence?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Retained Jurisdiction Instead Of Placing
Mr. Rose On Probation Following His Plea Of Guilty To Attempted Strangulation
Several mitigating factors are present in Mr. Rose’s case, all of which indicate that
probation would be appropriate, particularly in light of factors such as: Mr. Rose was only
eighteen years old at the time, and Mr. Rose expressed considerable remorse and accepted
responsibility for his wrongful acts.
The district court’s insufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors, and therefore,
its insufficient consideration of the sentencing criteria set forth in Idaho Code Section 19-2521,
caused it to abuse its discretion by declining to place Mr. Rose on probation. This Court should
remedy that abuse.
Mr. Rose asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court erred in failing to
place him on probation. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
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giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). On appeal, the focus is upon the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 627 (Ct. App. 1998). Mr. Rose does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. As the sentence is not illegal, Mr. Rose must show
that the sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary objective of protecting society and
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Id. The district court should
consider probation under the following factors: Idaho Code Section 19-2521 provides the
criteria a court should accord weight to in determining whether to place a defendant on probation
or impose imprisonment.2

2

(1) The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances
of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion
that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation
the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the
community; or
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Mr. Rose was only eighteen years old when he committed the first of the instant offenses.
(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Rose had a difficult childhood, filled with physical abuse. (PSI, pp.289-90.)
Mr. Rose’s mother is supportive of her son. (PSI, pp.10, 18, 305.) See State v. Shideler, 103

(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be
accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment:
(a) The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm;
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten harm;
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s
criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) The victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or facilitated the
commission of the crime;
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal
conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; provided, however, nothing
in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in
combination;
(g) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has
led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the
present crime;
(h) The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur;
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the commission of
another crime is unlikely.
(3) When a person who has been convicted of a crime is not sentenced to imprisonment,
the court may place the defendant on probation if the supervision, guidance, assistance or
direction is needed that the probation service has the resources to provide.
I.C. § 19-2521.
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Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family
and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).
The district court should have placed Mr. Rose on probation. Mr. Rose demonstrated that
he was proactive in making the changes necessary to be successful on probation by taking
classes prior to sentencing. (Tr., p.36, L.1 – p.37, L.17.) Mr. Rose was in a “program dorm”
while incarcerated, and graduated two out of the three classes provided by the program—the
substance abuse program and the workforce readiness program. (Tr., p.36, Ls.2-10; PSI, pp.3738.) Further, he had learned from the Active Behavioral Change program about focusing on
behavioral roots, and this program had made Mr. Rose aware of the impact his criminal actions
had on, not only himself, but the community, those he loves, and everyone that has ever invested
in him. (Tr., p.37, Ls.14-21; PSI, p.18.) The court considered placing Mr. Rose in local custody
for 180 days while he completed a domestic violence class, but ultimately chose to sentence him
to a rider. (Tr., p.41, Ls.12-25.)
Further, Mr. Rose expressed great remorse for his conduct and took responsibility for his
acts. (PSI, pp.3-4, 298.) Mr. Rose verbalized accountability for his actions at his pre-sentencing
interview. (PSI, pp.3-4.) He wrote, when asked how he felt about having committed the crime,
“Remorseful, very sad, regretful, disappointed, disgusted.” (PSI, p.4.) Idaho recognizes that
some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts
responsibility for his acts. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence
of first time offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in
his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988),
reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) (reducing sentence of first time offender who
accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at
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issue); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that some leniency is
required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his
problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character”).
The court sentenced Mr. Rose without sufficiently considering all of the mitigating
factors present in this case. Because the district court failed to consider all of these factors, it
abused its discretion by failing to suspend the sentence and place Mr. Rose on probation.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Rose
And By Failing To Further Reduce His Sentence
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must evaluate
whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135,
137 (2001). “The decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish
jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and
will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho
285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 2010). Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained
jurisdiction, this Court reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the
original judgment. Id. at 289. Although a recommendation from corrections officials who
supervised the defendant while on the retained jurisdiction may influence a court’s decision, the
recommendation is purely advisory and is in no way binding upon the court. State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011)). “Good
performance while on retained jurisdiction, though commendable, does not alone establish an
abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to grant probation.” Id.

7

Mr. Rose contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction and
by failing to further reduce his sentence in light of his successes during his period of retained
jurisdiction, his recognition of a problem, and his desire to make the changes necessary so that
this type of incident does not happen again.
Mr. Rose was participating in his programming and had expressed a willingness to
change his criminal thinking and behavior.

(PSI, pp.340-42, 345-52.)

In fact, the Idaho

Department of Correction recommended that Mr. Rose be placed on probation. (PSI, p.338;
Tr., p.50, Ls.15-16.) Although, while on his rider, Mr. Rose did receive disciplinary sanctions,3
he also voluntarily saw a Clinician for extra processing time. (PSI, p.347.) While on the rider,
he showed excellent insight into his triggers, relapse warning signs, and high-risk situations.
(PSI, p.347.) As Mr. Rose told the district court:
Throughout this rider I was honest with myself and my instructors and everybody
around me, and that allowed me the opportunity to start working on myself
genuinely. Because this crime is my first crime where I felt this kind of remorse
and responsibility for my actions. And I did have struggles throughout this
program. This is the first time I have ever been in an anger management class my
whole life, and I greatly benefitted from it.
I had an issue at the beginning with following the rules, and I never took it to the
extent to which I – obviously I didn’t graduate because I did – and I finished all
my classes. I have turned in all my homework and completed all of the work in
all of my classes.
...
And right here it clearly states that, “He has become very good at using his anger
control sequenced and control his anger tendencies.” In my ART class, I have
looked into my actions more than I ever have in my life and would like the
opportunity to example my gratitude for getting sent on this rider and giving –
being given the opportunity to take an anger class and all the rest of the classes
because I have learned a lot from this program and I need to start making a
change.
3

Mr. Rose refused to stop saying the word “fuck”; this behavior resulted in a formal Disciplinary
Offense Report (DOR). (PSI, p.340.)
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At this point, I have a job waiting for me today if I am granted the opportunity.
And I am – I have a great support net. I have a lot of people out there rooting for
me and a lot of things that I am looking forward to doing that involve building
myself and others around me. And I would only ask for the opportunity to show
you that I am ready to take my life seriously, Your Honor.
(Tr., p.53, L.20 – p.55, L.10.)
However, the district court failed to recognize that Mr. Rose’s accomplishments while on
the retained jurisdiction would equate to a successful probation. The district court disregarded
the probation recommendation, implying that it believed the facilitators in the retained
jurisdiction program were “driven by population concerns” to make a probation recommendation
for Mr. Rose. (Tr., p.55, Ls.13-18.) The district court recounted a situation where another judge
in the county ordered people involved in the retained jurisdiction program to the county to
discuss the issue, and he learned that they had been “instructed to give everyone a probation
recommendation regardless of how well they did,” and concluded, “I frankly think that’s what’s
driving the recommendation here.” (Tr., p.55, L.24 – p.56, L.1.) The court then relinquished its
jurisdiction over Mr. Rose, but reduced his sentence to make him immediately parole eligible.
(Tr., p.57, Ls.16-22.)
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court that
demonstrates Mr. Rose’s significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Rose and failed to further reduce his
sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Rose respectfully requests that this Court place him on probation or further reduce
the fixed portion of his sentence.
DATED this 14th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas

10

